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## Remember is past-directed, parasitic, and authentic *imagine*

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Much recent work in philosophy and neuroscience has argued that remembering past events is just a (special) kind of imagining future events (see e.g. Addis, 2018). This work suggests that the syntax and semantics of *remember* are but a restrictive version of *imagine*. My talk supports this suggestion by investigating the modification behavior and truth-conditional contribution of *remember* vis-à-vis *imagine*.

In contrast to their *imagine*-counterparts (see (1a)), *remember*-reports with a reflexive pronoun (see (1b-i)) are typically taken to resist modification with a third-person/'outside' viewpoint adjunct. Such modification is only possible if *remember* is replaced by a mental depiction predicate like *visualize* (see (1b-ii)). In philosophy, the deviance of (1b-i) is often attributed to the AUTHENTICITY of memory.

- (1) a. Bo imagines himself swimming *from the perspective of s.o. on a cliff*.  
b. Bo {i. #remembers, ii. visualizes} himself swimming *from the perspective of someone on a cliff*.

The greater semantic strictness of *remember* w.r.t. *imagine* is further supported by the fact that the truthmakers of *remember*-reports are a proper subset of the truthmakers of *imagine*-reports (cf. Cresswell, 1982): In contrast to (2b) (which is true in all circumstances from (3)), the truth of the memory report (2a) requires that the constructed scenario is PAST-DIRECTED and referentially depends (or is PARASITIC) on another (single) experience (cf. Blumberg, 2019; Maier, 2015). These requirements effect that, unlike (2b), (2a) is false/deviant in circumstances like (3c-d):

- (2) John {a. remembers, b. imagines} a woman waltzing.  
(3) John is constructing a scenario in which . . . [truth-value of (2a), (2b)]  
a. . . . the woman whom he saw *waltz* at the park is waltzing. [T, ?]  
b. . . . the woman whom he saw *tango* at the park is waltzing. [T, T]  
c. . . . the woman whom he saw at the park is waltzing with [??, T]  
the man of whom he had dreamt.  
d. . . . some woman – no one in particular – is waltzing. [F, T]

My talk provides a decompositional semantics for the English verb *remember* as PAST-DIRECTED, PARASITIC, and AUTHENTIC *imagine* that captures this behavior.

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