
Teasing apart experiential and doxastic meanings of subjective attitude verbs

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Subjective attitude verbs (SAVs), like *find* and *consider*, are known to embed only subjective clauses, e.g., clauses containing a predicate of personal taste (PPT) or, more generally, a gradable predicate (Sæbø, 2009 and much subsequent work). However, SAVs do not form a single uniform class: further asymmetries have been observed between *find* and *consider*. Main theories about SAVs may be characterized along two descriptive dimensions. On one dimension, proposals in the literature differ as to the kind of restriction that *find* imposes on its complement clause (hereby, *p*): either a direct experience requirement (Stephenson, 2007; Muñoz 2019; Korotkova & Anand 2021) or a subjectivity requirement (Sæbø, 2009; Kennedy & Willer 2016). On the second descriptive dimension, theories about SAVs can be distinguished according to whether (or not) they take *find* to express a doxastic attitude of the subject (Stephenson, 2007; Kennedy & Willer, 2016; Korotkova & Anand, 2021), or not (Sæbø, 2009; Muñoz 2019).

To assess the theories on the market, we set up an acceptability task aimed at testing the experiential vs. doxastic meanings of SAVs. Specifically, we constructed scenarios triggering a potential doxastic conflict (PDC), i.e., a situation where a subject holds a belief that *p* but, for some reason, her perceptual experience (temporarily) suggests that not-*p*. We then tested the acceptability of *find* and *consider* reports after contexts triggering a PDC or not. Although all the contexts satisfied both the direct experience and the subjectivity requirements, results showed that attributions with *find* after PDC contexts produced significantly lower acceptability rates than their counterparts with *consider*. We suggest that non-doxastic accounts (Sæbø, 2009; Muñoz, 2019) are better suited to explain the results: the absence of a doxastic component in the denotation of *find* allows the system the necessary flexibility to represent experiential content independently enough from belief.

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